Abstract. The paper deals with Nyberg-Rueppel digital signatures without message recovery. Probability of signature forgery is analyzed and assessed. Some simple methods to minimize probability of signature forgery are proposed.
Introduction
In contemporary electronics, data (like software, measurement data, transmitted data and also structure of electronic circuits) can be changed in malicious, frequently dangerous way. Digital signatures are methods preventing these malicious attacks.
Every digital signature scheme like common hand written signature under a document has three main properties:
1. the signature of a person A can be created only by the person A, 2. the signature should be unforgeable, 3 . the signature should be verifiable.
Every signature scheme is composed of two algorithms: algorithm of signing (used by a document Signer) and algorithm of verification (used by a signature Verifier).
There are many different signature schemes. In general signature schemes are divided into two categories: one-time signature schemes [1, 2] and multi-use signature schemes [1, 2] . There are also two kinds of signature schemes: signature with message recovery and signature schemes with appendix (i.e. without message recovery). There are also special signatures with additional functionality like blind signatures (called also in blanco signatures), undeniable signature schemes and fail-stop signatures.
For example, one-time signature schemes are the following algorithms: one-time Rabin signatures, one-time Lamport signatures and one time Matyas-Meyer signatures.
Widely applied in practice multi use schemes are the following: RSA, ElGamal, DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm), ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA), Rabin, Shnore signatures, finally Nyberg-Rueppel class of signatures. Some of them are introduced to the public key cryptography standard IEEE P1363.
Nyberg-Rueppel signature schemes are wide class of digital signatures with very interesting properties. All NybergRueppel signatures are probabilistic in the sense that the signature depends on a signed document and a random variable. Security of all Nyberg-Rueppel signatures is based on DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem).
We consider in the paper simple particular case of NybergRueppel scheme: so called Nyberg-Rueppel scheme without message recovery (i.e. signature scheme with appendix). In the sequel we analyze and assess probability of forgery in this signature scheme and propose simple methods to control probability of forgery.
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Nyberg-Rueppel digital signature scheme without message recovery
Nyberg-Rueppel digital signature (in the considered in the paper version) is the signature scheme with appendix i.e. without plain text message recovery. General assumptions are the following. Assume G is a finite group of the order n i.e. n df = #G. Additionally we assume n ≥ 3 to avoid triviality. The plaintext message m (the message which is signed) is identified with an element of the group G then m ∈ G.
Assume additionally that f : G → Z n is an arbitrary but fixed bijection of the group G on the ring Z n of integers modulo n. Assume also that g ∈ G, g = 1 is a generator of the group G or an element of the sufficiently large order. We assume for security reasons that the group G and the element g are chosen in this way that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) with the basis g is practically unsolvable in the group G.
Signer chooses at random a number x ∈ Z n so, that GCD(x, n) = 1 and x = 1. The number x is a private key and is secret. Now, Signer computes g x ∈ G and publishes y df = g x as a public key. Signer publishes also the order of the group G i.e. n, bijection f : G → Z n and element g.
If #G = 2 then Z * 2 = {1} and only possible choice of x ∈ Z * 2 is x = 1. Because y = g 1 = g everyone knows immediately the Signer's private key. Hence the order of the group G is assumed in the sequel ≥ 3. In practice the order of the group G is a large number because DLP have to be unsolvable.
Algorithm of signing a document (a plaintext message m) i.e. signature generation is shown in Fig. 1 . The signed document m is an arbitrary element of the group G. The signature is an ordered pair (a, b) ∈ G × Z n . The document is signed in similar way like in ElGamal signature scheme. The signed document is an ordered pair (m, (a, b)). Nyberg-Rueppel signature verification algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 . Proof. 1. If GCD(a, m) = 1 then an inverse a −1 of a number a( mod m) in the ring Z m exists. Hence, multiplying both sides of the congruence ax ≡ ay(modm) by a −1 , we have a −1 ax ≡ a −1 ay(modm). Because a −1 a(modm) = 1 then x ≡ y(modm). If x ≡ y(modm) then multiplying both sides of the congruence by a we obtain ax ≡ ay(modm). Example. Because 5·2 ≡ 5·(−4)( mod 6) and GCD(5, 6) = 1, then we have also 2 ≡ (−4)(mod6). Proof. 1. We can easily verify that the integer x = ba −1 ( mod m) (where a −1 is an inverse of the integer a(modm) in the ring Z m ) is a solution of the congruence ax ≡ b(modm). Indeed
. From the proved above Theorem 3.1 "on division side by side" we obtain now, that x ′ ≡ x(modm). On the other hand if 
Then the congruence ax ≡ b(modm) has the solution
The last congruence is fulfilled for exactly d numbers x 
Some basic theorems
The following simple fact from commutative ring theory is very useful in the sequel.
Fact 4.1
Assume Z n is a ring of integers modulo n and a ∈ Z n . An element a ∈ Z n is invertible in the ring Z n if and only if GCD(n, a) = 1.
Proof. see [3] [4] [5] .
Theorem 4.2. Assume G is a finite group of the order n ≥ 3, m ∈ G is a signed plain text message, x ∈ Z * n is a private key, g ∈ G, g = 1 is an arbitrary fixed element of the group G, y df = g
x is a public key and f : G → Z n is a bijection. If the Nyberg-Rueppel signature is correctly computed i.e.
where k ∈ Z * n is an arbitrary element chosen from Z *
Proof. From properties of raising to a power in groups we have:
It follows from the Lagrange theorem that for every element a ∈ G we have a #G = 1 i.e. a n = 1. Then for arbitrary r ∈ Z we have a r = a r( mod n) .
From (2) we obtain that the following equality is fulfilled
Then from (3) we have:
and finally we obtain:
Theorem 4.3. If f : G → Z n is a bijection and x ∈ Z * n is a fixed element of the multiplicative group Z * n then for every c ∈ Z n the function β :
Proof. If x ∈ Z * n then from the Theorem 3.2 we obtain directly that the function
is a bijection. The function
is also a bijection then β = γ 2 (γ 1 ) as a superposition of two bijections is a bijection.
Corollary 4.4.
Under assumptions of the theorem 4.3 the number of elements a ∈ G for which GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 is exactly even to ϕ(n), where ϕ : N → N is the Euler's function.
Proof. A number of invertible elements in the ring
from the Theorem 4.3 is a bijection then the number of elements a ∈ G for which GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 is exactly even to ϕ(n).
Theorem 4.5. Assume G is a finite group of the order n ≥ 3, m ∈ G is a signed plain text message, x ∈ Z * n is a Signer's private key, g ∈ G, g = 1 an arbitrary fixed element of the group G, y df = g x and f : G → Z n is a bijection then:
1. If b is the second coordinate of the Nyberg-Rueppel signature (a, b) of the plain text message m ∈ G (more strictly b is computed as
In other words there is only one plain text message m ∈ G and one random value k ∈ Z * n that the Nyberg-Rueppel signature computed for m ∈ G and k ∈ Z * n (and for the fixed Signer's private key
Then there is no plain text message m ′ ∈ G, m ′ = m, for which the Signer's signature is equal to (a, b). As a result the signature forgery is impossible.
3. If g ∈ G is a generator of the group G then for every
Ad. 2. If GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 then we can solve in unique way in Z n Eq. (5) with an unknown k. (see the Theorem 3.2). Having k ∈ Z * n , we compute from Eq. (4) the unique value m ∈ G.
Ad. 3. From the Theorem 3.3 we obtain that Eq. (5) (with an unknown k) has d different solutions in Z n and from Eq. (4) we obtain d different plain text messages which fulfill the Eq. (4).
Two possible situations (forgery impossible, forgery possible) as mentioned in the Theorem 4.5 are shown in Fig. 3 . (m, (a, b) )) then the verification formula
can be in equivalent way written as
In other words: the problem "if (a, b) ∈ G × Z * n is a signature written (by a person with a private key x) under the plain text message m" is equivalent to fulfillment of the formula (7).
Proof. 1. From the Theorem 4.5 we obtain that for the given ordered pair (a, b) ∈ G × Z * n there is a unique ordered pair (m ′ , k) ∈ G × Z * n for which we have
We assume that GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 then 1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x ∈ Z * n . A product of two invertible numbers from Z * n is invertible then b is invertible i.e. b ∈ Z * n . From (9) we have
On the other hand we have from (8)
and using (10) we obtain
2. Verification of the signature (m, (a, b)) is simply verification if m ′ = m. Using (11) we can write down equivalently equation
If we raise both sides of this equation to the power b ∈ Z * n then we equivalently have
It can be written as
Because g n = 1 then equivalently we have
The above equation can be equivalently written as
But the public key y = g x then finally we have
It is important that in the verification formula (7) we have no secret private key x.
Probability of forgery
From the Theorem 4.5 we obtain directly the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. If G is a finite cyclic group of the order n ≥ 3, g = 1, g ∈ G is a generator of the group G, x ∈ Z * n is a fixed private key of Signer and f : G → Z n a fixed arbitrary bijection then for every a ∈ G: Nyberg-Rueppel signature (a, b) is unforgeable if and only if GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1.
In other words if an element
The element 1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x ∈ Z n is invertible if and only if b ∈ Z n (the second coordinate of signature) is invertible. The random element k ∈ Z * n has no influence on invertibility of the element 1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x.
We have only ϕ(n) elements a of the group G for which the element 1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x ∈ Z n is invertible. Denote A df ={a ∈ G; GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1}, of course #A = ϕ(n). For every a ∈ A forgery is not possible.
Assume that assumptions o the Corollary 5.1 are fulfilled and we have defined two random variables X 1 and X 2 (see Bull. Pol. Ac.: Tech. 62(4) 2014 the Appendix A). The random variable X 1 describes choosing at random value k ∈ Z * n and the random variable X 2 describes choosing a plain text message m. From the Theorem A4 (from the Appendix A) it follows that if one of these random variables has a uniform probability distribution and X 1 , X 2 are independent then the random variable g −X1 · X 2 (which describes computation of the first coordinate of the Nyberg-Rueppel signature) has a uniform probability distribution on G. Hence a probability, that the first coordinate g −X1 · X 2 of the Nyberg-Rueppel signature belongs to G\A, is even to 1 − ϕ(n)/n i.e.
In other words, probability of forgery is exactly even to 1 − ϕ(n)/n. Because the value 1 − ϕ(n)/n describes probability of forgery it is important to choose the appropriate n so that 1 − ϕ(n)/n would be small. Proof. It is a direct conclusion from basic properties of the Euler's function ϕ.
But in general the following well known property holds. Proof. see [3, 4, 6] .
Theorem 5.4. Assume B(G, Z n ) is the set of all bijections f : G → Z n from the group G of the order n ≥ 3, to the ring Z n and (B(G, Z n ), 2 B(G,Zn) , P ) is a probabilistic space. If the probability distribution P is a uniform on B(G, Z n ) then for every fixed a ∈ G and every fixed x ∈ Z * n we have:
where ϕ is the Euler function.
Proof. 1. The function h : Z n → Z n defined with the formula
2. Assume we have fixed a ∈ G and x ∈ Z * n then: a bijection f : G → Z n fulfills the condition GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 if and only if f (a) ∈ B.
3. It follows from the p. 2 that the number of all bijections f ∈ B(G, Z n ) fulfilling the condition GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 is equal to ϕ(n) · (n − 1)! on the other hand #B(G, Z n ) = n! then:
Simple methods to improve the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme and control probability of forgery
We propose in the sequel two methods to control probability of forgery in the Nyberg-Rueppel signature schemes. The first is based on the Theorem 5.4 and Bernoulli process, the second is based on the Theorem 6.1 formulated below. The first method which allows to control probability of forgery. Assume (B(G, Z n ), 2 B(G,Zn) , P ) probabilistic space with the uniform probability distribution P on B(G, Z n ). If a ∈ G is a fixed element of the group G and x ∈ Z * n is a fixed element of Z * n then using the Theorem 5.4 we can define a sequence of independent random variables:
with values in the set {0, 1} in the following way. Assume we do a series of independent experiments. In every experiment we choose at random a bijection f from the set B(G, Z n )(with the uniform distribution). For every i ∈ N : X i = 1 if and only if in the i-th experiment we have chosen a bijection f : G → Z n so that GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1.
From the Theorem 5.4 it follows that the sequence of independent random variables (X i ) ∞ i=1 is a Bernoulli stochastic process defined on the probabilistic space (B(G, Z n ), 2 B(G,Zn) , P ) with probability of success equal to ϕ(n) n it means that for every i ∈ N we have
Introduce now, the random variable Y defined on the probabilistic space (B(G, Z n ), 2 B(G,Zn) , P ),with values in the set N ∪ {+∞} in the following way. We have defined above a Bernoulli process (X i ) ∞ i=1 of independent experiments. For every s ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, Y = s if and only if the condition GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 is true the first time in the s-th experiment, Y = +∞ if and only if the condition GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) > 1 is true in every experiment. The random variable Y is a time till the first success in the Bernoulli process then it has geometrical distribution and we have (see [3] ): for every s ∈ N
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Proposed method is based on random choosing a bijection f : G → Z n from the set B(G, Z n ) (with the uniform probability distribution on B(G, Z n )) and next verifying if
If GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 then we have found the appropriate bijection.
If GCD(1 − n f (a) ⊗ n x, n) > 1 then we repeat the random choosing.
In short, we try at random some different independent bijections (a sequence of bijections) till the first success.
From the formulas (13) we have that the average time till the first success (i.e. the first bijection
.
The second method which allows to control probability of forgery
The second (deterministic) method which allows to control probability of forgery is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1.
Assume G is a finite group of the order n, n ≥ 3 and x ∈ Z * n is a fixed element of the multiplicative group Z * n . For every n ∈ N there is a finite sequence of r bijections f 1 , f 2 , ..., f r , where for every i ∈< 1, r >, f i : G → Z n with the following property:
for every a ∈ G there is i ∈< 1, r > that
The smallest r from the above theorem is equal to n ϕ(n) ≥ 2.
Proof. 1. It is possible to write down the set G as a sum of
where r = n ϕ(n) and for every i ∈< 1, r > we have #A i = ϕ(n) and additionally for every i, j ∈< 1, r − 1 >, i = j we have A i ∩ A j = ∅. It means that A 1 , A 2 , ..., A r−1 are disjoint in pairs. As the the last subset A r we can take every set which fulfils two conditions: #A i = ϕ(n) and
2. Now, we can define r bijections h 1 , h 2 , ..., h r , where for every i ∈< 1, r > , h i : G → Z n and h i (A i ) = Z * n . 3. For every bijection h i : G → Z n we can choose a bijection f i : G → Z n in this way that for every a ∈ G, we have h i (a) = 1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x. It is possible because we can take for every a ∈ G, f i (a) df =(h i (a) − n 1) ⊗ n x −1 , where x −1 is an inverse in the multiplicative group Z * n . The function f i : G → Z n is a bijection as superposition of 3 bijections.
4. From the point 1, we obtain now that for every a ∈ G there is i ∈< 1, r > that h i (a) ∈ Z * n or equivalently 1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x ∈ Z * n . Then finally we have found a finite sequence of r bijections f 1 , f 2 , ..., f r , that for every a ∈ G there is i ∈< 1, r > that GCD(1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1.
5. It is obvious that if h 1 , h 2 , ..., h s is an arbitrary finite sequence of s bijections h i : G → Z n then the smallest number s for which the following condition (14)
is fulfilled is equal to n ϕ(n) (of course n ϕ(n) ≥ 2).
Equivalently the condition (14) can be written in the following way
If we assume that for every a ∈ G we have h i (a) = h(a) = 1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x then the condition (15) we can write in the form
Then in short: for the given finite sequence f 1 , f 2 , ..., f s of s bijections f i : G → Z n the smallest number s for which the condition (16) is fulfilled is equal to n ϕ(n) .
That is easy to verify that for the group G of the order n = 2 the thesis of the above theorem is also fulfilled, but in the paper we assume for uniformity reason that n ≥ 3.
Of course we have
where A 1 , A 2 , ..., A r ⊆ G are subsets of G defined in the proof of the Theorem 6.2 or equivalently ∀ i∈<1,r>
The algorithm of the proposed method repeats the idea of the Theorem 6.1 proof.
1. Like in point 1 of the proof, we choose in arbitrary way sequence of r subsets
2. Using A 1 , A 2 , ..., A r we find a finite sequence of r bijections f 1 , f 2 , ..., f r , with the property, that for every a ∈ G there is i ∈< 1, r > that GCD(1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1.
3. Then we apply sequentially bijections f 1 , f 2 , ..., f r verifying for i = 1, 2, ..., r if GCD(1 − n f i (a)⊗ n x, n) = 1. The first i ∈< 1, r > for which GCD(1 − n f i (a) ⊗ n x, n) = 1 gives a bijection f i used to sign a document m.
Conclusions
1. We can easily assess probability of possible forgery in Nyberg-Rueppel signature schemes. 2. Security of the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme depends on the order n of the group G. Then the order of the group G have to be carefully chosen. 3. In the paper two simple methods of fully reliable NybergRueppel like signature schemes were proposed. The first, probabilistic is based on the Bernoulli stochastic process and is reliable from probabilistic point of view. The second method is deterministic and works always correctly. The essence of the presented two methods is that we are changing the bijection f so that forgery would be impossible. As a result the bijection f is not a universal parameter for the signature scheme like in classical Nyberg-Rueppel methods and the the chosen bijection f have to be added as a third coordinate to the signature. Then a signed plain text message has the shape (m, (a, b, f )).
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in an Abelian topological group G. If P Xi denotes a probability distribution of the random variable X i for i = 1, 2 and one of the probability distributions P X1 ,P X2 is uniform then a random variable Y df = X 1 · X 2 has the uniform distribution.
Proof. Assume P X1 is the uniform probability distribution then from theorems A1 and A2 we obtain for every A ∈ B(G) P Y (A) = P X1 * P X2 (A) = G P X1 (A · x −1 )P X2 (dx) = = G P X1 (A)P X2 (dx) = P X1 (A) G 1P X2 (dx) = P X1 (A).
Then the random variable Y df = X 1 · X 2 has the uniform distribution.
The above theorem is frequently used in cryptography in the case when the Abelian group G is finite.
For the finite cyclic group G, the following simple fact is true. If g ∈ G is a generator of the finite cyclic group G, the order of G is equal to n and X is a random variable with uniform probability distribution on the ring Z n then a random variable g X has a uniform probability distribution on G.
Theorem A4.
Assume we have two independent random variables X 1 and X 2 defined on a probabilistic space (Ω, M, P ). Assume additionally that g ∈ G is a generator of the finite cyclic group G, an order of G is equal to n ≥ 2, X 1 is a random variable into the ring Z n and X 2 is a random variable with values in the group G. If one of the random variables X 1 , X 2 has a uniform probability distribution (X 1 on Z n or X 2 on G) then a random variable g X1 · X 2 has a uniform probability distribution on G.
Proof.
A finite cyclic group is Abelian as in the Theorem A3. Hence if the random variable X 2 has a uniform probability distribution on G then from theorem A3 we obtain that the probability distribution of the random variable g X1 · X 2 is uniform. If the random variable X 1 has the uniform probability distribution on Z n then the random variable g X1 has the uniform distribution on G and from Theorem A3 we have that the probability distribution of the random variable g X1 · X 2 has a uniform probability distribution on G.
